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An Experiment on Lowest Unique Integer Games∗
Takashi Yamada†and Nobuyuki Hanaki‡
Abstract
We experimentally study Lowest Unique Integer Games (LUIGs) to determine if
and how subjects self-organize into different behavioral classes. In a LUIG, N (≥ 3)
players submit a positive integer up to M and the player choosing the smallest
number not chosen by anyone else wins. LUIGs are simplified versions of real
systems such as Lowest/Highest Unique Bid Auctions that have been attracting
attention from scholars, yet experimental studies are scarce. Furthermore, LUIGs
offer insights into choice patterns that can shed light on the alleviation of congestion
problems. Here, we consider four LUIGs with N = {3, 4} and M = {3, 4}. We find
that (a) choices made by more than 1/3 of subjects were not significantly different
from what a symmetric mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium (MSE) predicts; however,
(b) subjects who behaved significantly differently from what the MSE predicts won
the game more frequently. What distinguishes subjects was their tendencies to
change their choices following losses.
Keywords: Lowest Unique Integer Game, Laboratory Experiment
1 Introduction
We ran laboratory experiments to study the manner in which subjects play Lowest
Unique Integer Games (LUIGs) and if and how they self-select themselves into different
behavioral groups.
In a LUIG, N (≥ 3) players simultaneously submit a positive integer up to M . The
player choosing the smallest number that is not chosen by anyone else is the winner.
In cases where no player chooses a unique number, there is no winner. For instance,
suppose there is a LUIG with N = 3 and M = 3. There are three players, A, B, and C,
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who each submit an integer between 1 and 3. If the integers chosen by A, B, and C are
1, 2, and 3, respectively, then A wins the game. If the integers chosen by A, B and C
are 1, 1, and 2, respectively, then C is the winner. And, as noted, if all of them choose
the same integer, there is no winner.
LUIGs are highly simplified versions of real systems such as the Swedish lottery game
Limbo where the player who chooses the lowest unique number wins a cash prize (O¨stling
et al., 2011) and Lowest/Highest Unique Bid Auctions (LUBA/HUBA) like the Auction
Air or Juubeo websites where players bid, by paying a fixed participation fee, on prizes
such as electronic devices or jewelry and either the lowest or highest unique bid wins.
These systems differ from LUIGs in that the exact number of players (or participants)
is not known when participants are deciding which integer to choose or how much to
bid. In addition, unlike with LUIGs or the Swedish lottery, in LUBA/HUBA scenarios,
a winner has to pay the amount s/he bids in exchange for the item being auctioned.1
These types of real systems have been attracting much attention recently from schol-
ars of various disciplines (Costa-Gomes and Shimoji, 2014; Eichberger and Vinogradov,
2008; Gallice, 2009; Houba et al., 2011; Juul et al., 2013; Mohlin et al., 2014, 2015; Ot-
subo et al., 2013; Pigolotti et al., 2012; Rapoport et al., 2009b; Raviv and Virag, 2009;
Zhou et al., 2015). While the studies mentioned investigate these related systems the-
oretically and empirically, experimental studies on LUIGs and related systems are still
scarce. O¨stling et al. (2011), Otsubo et al. (2013), and Chmura and Gu¨th (2011) are three
experimental studies that are closely related to ours. O¨stling et al. (2011) experimentally
study a version of the Swedish lottery in which subjects were not informed of the exact
number of players in the game. Otsubo et al. (2013) experimentally study a version of
LUBA/HUBA in which subjects were informed of the number of players, N , and the
strategy space, {1, 2, ..,M}, for (N,M) ∈ {(5, 4), (5, 25), (10, 25)}. But unlike our exper-
iment in which the winner receives a fixed payoff regardless of the number chosen, the
winner’s payoff in Otsubo et al. (2013) depends on the number he or she has chosen.
Chmura and Gu¨th (2011) use experiments to study a three-player minority game. In a
minority game, three or more odd-numbered players choose one of two options. Thus, a
1There are other differences depending on the auction site. For example, in a HUBA on the Juubeo
website, participants can place multiple bids by paying a small fee for each additional bid and they are
immediately informed whether their current bid is the current winning bid.
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three-player minority game is structurally equivalent to a LUIG with N = 3 and M = 2.
The minority game originates from the “El Farol Bar” problem (Arthur, 1994) which is
based on people independently deciding whether to go to a popular bar or not; if too
many people independently choose to go to the bar, it will be too crowded and those who
stayed at home are better off than those at the bar. The opposite is true when the bar
is not too crowded. This problem has been extensively studied both by economists and
physicists. See, among others, Challet and Zhang (1997, 1998) for theoretical analyses,
and Bottazzi and Devetag (2003, 2007); Chmura and Pitz (2006); Devetag et al. (2011);
Linde et al. (2014); Platkowski and Ramsza (2003) for experimental studies with larger
numbers of players. The experimental method of Chmura and Gu¨th (2011) is, however,
different from ours in that they directly elicit a mixed strategy (a probability distribu-
tion over two choices) from each subject. In our experiment, each subject submits a pure
strategy (i.e., an integer).
Furthermore, LUIGs are fertile ground for experimental study because unlike minor-
ity games where multiple players can win the game, LUIGs consider a situation with an
extreme congestion effect because at most one player can win. Games with a congestion
effect have applications for problems such as the choice of traffic routes (Selten et al.,
2007) that are known to generate an interesting phenomenon called the Braess paradox,
a situation exemplified by improvements in a road network actually worsening traffic
problems (Morgan et al., 2009; Rapoport et al., 2009a). In situations with congestion
effects, an interesting question is how players learn to either consciously or unconsciously
coordinate their behavior so that inefficiencies due to congestion are reduced. Hanaki
et al. (2011) theoretically examine this question in what they call “a parking problem.”
In their “parking problem,” available options are clearly ordered in terms of their desir-
ability which is the same for all players. Since each option can be taken by at most one
player, when more than one player chooses the same option, only one of them obtains
it. By applying a reinforcement learning model, Hanaki et al. (2011) show that ex ante
homogeneous players separate themselves into “lucky” and “unlucky” ones. They show
that some “lucky” players learn to choose “better options” all the time because their early
successes in doing so reinforced these options as the right choice, but other “unlucky”
players learn to choose “worse options” all the time because in the early stages of their
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learning processes they failed to obtain a good outcome when they had actually chosen
the “better option.” However, it is precisely because of the existence of the latter players
who have settled into choosing “worse options” that the former group continues to have
a positive experience from doing what they do, namely, choosing “better options.”
In this paper, we aim to study such self-organization among players experimentally.
In particular, we wish to gain insight into whether and how subjects separate themselves
into different behavioral classes in situations with an extreme-congestion effect such as
LUIGs. Recall that in LUIGs, the winning payoff is the same regardless of the number
the winner has chosen. We expect this feature, which is absent in the LUBA or HUBA
scenarios mentioned above, will facilitate the self-organization of subjects that we are
interested in. In addition, by eliminating the round-by-round fluctuations in the number
of players, we can focus on subjects’ behavior in a stable (at least in terms of number
of players) environment, which should again favor self-organization. Thus, we believe
LUIGs offer a good starting point for studying self-organization among players.
We found that some subjects kept choosing the same number, while others switched
their choices often. We also found that the first type of subject won the game more
frequently than the latter type of subject. However, it should be noted that a strategy of
sticking to the same number pays off in a LUIG only when other players do not employ
the same strategy. Thus, it is the existence of the latter type of subjects that benefits
the strategy employed by the former types. We also found that choices made by more
than 1/3 of subjects were not significantly different from those under the symmetric
mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium (MSE) of the LUIG.
Below, we report experimental results for four LUIGs with varying numbers of players,
N , and varying sets of integers from which players choose, {1, 2, · · · ,M}. Namely, we
consider N ∈ {3, 4} and M ∈ {3, 4}. Given the exploratory nature of these experiments,
the results we report in this paper are descriptive.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: the next section explains the exper-
iments; Section 3 summarizes the results of our experiments; and Section 4 ends the
paper with a concluding remark.
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Table 1: Two games played in each session
Session Game 1 Game 2
1 (N,M) = (3, 3) (N,M) = (3, 4)
2 (N,M) = (3, 4) (N,M) = (4, 4)
3 (N,M) = (4, 4) (N,M) = (4, 3)
4 (N,M) = (4, 3) (N,M) = (3, 3)
5 (N,M) = (3, 4) (N,M) = (3, 3)
6 (N,M) = (3, 3) (N,M) = (4, 3)
7 (N,M) = (4, 3) (N,M) = (4, 4)
8 (N,M) = (4, 4) (N,M) = (3, 4)
2 Experiments
We consider four LUIGs with N ∈ {3, 4} and M ∈ {3, 4}. Each subject played two
separate LUIGs. We changed either N or M , but not both, between the two games a
subject played. Thus, we had eight pairs of games as shown in Table 1. Each LUIG was
repeated 50 times with the same group of subjects. We call one play of a game a round.
There was a non-binding time limit of 15 seconds for choosing an integer in each round.
When the time limit was reached, a warning sign appeared on the screen to urge the
subject to make a choice. After everyone in the group made their choices, the subjects
were informed of the result of the round. The feedback consisted of whether a subject
was a winner or not, in addition to the winning number for the round. Subjects were
informed that the winning number was set to zero when there was no winner.
Once the 50 rounds of the first LUIG were completed, subjects were re-matched to
form another group to play the second LUIG for 50 rounds. Subjects were initially told
that they would play two LUIGs with 50 rounds each, but were not informed about the
exact game (i.e., N and M) until the start of each game. At the beginning of each game,
they were reminded that the other subjects in their group would remain the same during
the 50 rounds.
Subjects were paid according to the outcome of one randomly chosen round from
each game. The winner of a game received 20 euros in addition to a participation fee of
10 euros. Thus the maximum a subject could earn was 50 euros. Subjects were paid in
cash at the end of the experiment.2
2The English translation of the experiment’s instructions can be found in the Appendix.
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Table 2: Probability of choosing each number under the symmetric mixed-strategy Nash
equilibrium for the four LUIGs
N M 1 2 3 4
LUIG33 3 3 0.464 0.268 0.268
LUIG34 3 4 0.458 0.252 0.145 0.145
LUIG43 4 3 0.449 0.426 0.125
LUIG44 4 4 0.448 0.425 0.126 0.002
3 Results
Computerized experiments, implemented using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007), took place in
January and February 2014 at the Laboratoire d’Expe´rimentation en Sciences Sociales et
Analyse des Comportements (LESSAC), Burgundy School of Business (Dijon, France).
192 students who had never experienced a LUIG experiment participated. There were
24 students in each of the 8 sessions listed in Table 1. A session lasted between 65 and
85 minutes. Out of our 192 subjects, 11 earned 50 euros and 67 earned 30 euros. The
remaining 114 subjects earned only the participation fee of 10 euros.
Because a LUIG has many asymmetric pure and mixed-strategy Nash equilibria that
are payoff asymmetric, we used the unique symmetric mixed strategy Nash equilibrium
(MSE) of the LUIG as our theoretical benchmark. Readers may find our choice of MSE as
a benchmark rather puzzling given our interest in investigating whether subjects separate
themselves by choosing to employ different types of strategies. But it is precisely because
of this reason that we use the MSE as our benchmark. We seek to determine whether
and how the observed behavior of subjects, individually as well as in aggregate, deviates
from a theoretical benchmark that assumes symmetry.
The MSEs for the four LUIGs we have experimented with are summarized in Table 2.3
We abbreviate the four LUIGs (N,M) = (3, 3), (N,M) = (3, 4), (N,M) = (4, 3), and
(N,M) = (4, 4) using the terms LUIG33, LUIG34, LUIG43, and LUIG44, respectively.
Table 3 shows the relative frequencies of the observed winning numbers in the four
LUIGs. We are pooling all the groups that played the relevant LUIG. For each LUIG, the
predicted relative frequencies under the MSE are also reported. Recall that a winning
number “0” represents a case without any winner. For three out of four LUIGs, namely,
3O¨stling et al. (2011) provide a succinct algorithm to calculate MSE in LUIGs.
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Table 3: Relative frequencies of observed winning numbers
a. LUIG 33 b. LUIG 34
Expr. MSE Expr. MSE
Winning number Winning number
0 12.88% 13.84% 0 8.88% 11.80%
1 40.50% 39.99% 1 43.31% 40.38%
2 26.88% 23.09% 2 29.18% 22.20%
3 19.75% 23.09% 3 15.94% 12.81%
4 2.69% 12.81%
c. LUIG 43 d. LUIG 44
Expr. MSE Expr. MSE
Winning number Winning number
0 33.33% 32.91% 0 27.17% 32.63%
1 27.50% 30.09% 1 32.42% 30.17%
2 32.17% 28.60% 2 30.41% 28.63%
3 7.00% 8.40% 3 8.33% 8.47%
4 1.67% 0.01%
LUIG33, LUIG43, and LUIG44, the observed frequencies of winning numbers are very
similar to what the MSE of each game predicts. The major difference between the
prediction of the MSE and the experimental outcome is observed in LUIG34 in which
“4” was much less frequently the winning number in the experiment compared to the
MSE.
Although, on aggregate, we observed that the frequencies of winning numbers were
not so different from the predictions under MSE except for in LUIG 34, if we compare
the frequencies of the various outcomes (the sets of numbers chosen by subjects) to those
predicted by the MSE, we find that in some groups they are significantly different from
the prediction under the MSE (we call these non-MSE groups) and in other groups they
are similar to the MSE predictions (MSE groups). We employ Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS)
tests to compare the data with the MSE predictions, and use 5% significance level in
determining non-MSE and MSE groups. However, it should be noted again that except
for LUIG 34, most of the groups in our data are classified as MSE groups according to
the criterion used. See the number of two types of groups in each LUIG shown under
the corresponding panel in Figure 1.
Figure 1 shows, for each of the four LUIGs, the average frequencies of set of chosen
numbers for MSE groups (shaded) and non-MSE groups (black). The theoretical bench-
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a. LUIG 33 b. LUIG 34
 0
 0.1
 0.2
 0.3
 0.4
 0.5
 0.6
111 112* 113* 122* 123* 133* 222 223 233 333
Relative frequency
MSE prediction
MSE groups
non-MSE groups
 0
 0.1
 0.2
 0.3
 0.4
 0.5
 0.6
111
112*
113*
114*
122*
123*
124*
133*
134*
144*
222
223
234
233
234
244
333
334
344
444
Relative frequency
MSE prediction
MSE groups
non-MSE groups
# MSE group = 28, # non-MSE group = 4 # MSE group = 19, # non-MSE group = 13
c. LUIG 43 d. LUIG 44
 0
 0.1
 0.2
 0.3
 0.4
 0.5
 0.6
1111
1112*
1113
1122*
1123*
1133
1222*
1223*
1233*
1333*
2222
2223
2233
2333
3333
Relative frequency
MSE prediction
MSE groups
non-MSE groups
 0
 0.1
 0.2
 0.3
 0.4
 0.5
 0.6
1111
1112*
1113
1114
1122*
1123*
1124*
1133
1134
1144
1222*
1223*
1224*
1233*
1234*
1244*
1333*
1334*
1344*
1444*
2222
2223
2224
2233
2234
2244
2333
2334
2344
2444
3333
3334
3344
3444
4444
Relative frequency
MSE prediction
MSE groups
non-MSE groups
# MSE group = 23, # non-MSE group = 1 # MSE group = 21 # non-MSE group = 3
Figure 1: Histogram of the average relative frequencies of game outcomes (set of chosen
number) under MSE (white), MSE groups (shaded), and non-MSE groups (black).
marks according to the MSE are also shown in white for each LUIG. It also indicates
those outcomes that are equilibria under the pure strategy Nash equilibrium by “∗” next
to the label in the x-axis. What we can observe first is that those outcomes that are not
supported by the pure strategy Nash equilibrium (those without “∗” next to the label
on the x-axis) are frequently observed, in particular, among MSE groups. For non-MSE
groups, the observed outcomes tend to be the equilibria under the pure strategy Nash
equilibrium. The noticeable differences between MSE and non-MSE groups in term of
frequencies of outcomes are as follow: in LUIG 33 and LUIG 34, the outcomes (112)
and (122) are less frequently observed in the former group than in the latter, while the
outcome (123) is more frequently observed in the former group than in the latter; in
LUIG 43 and LUIG 44, the outcomes (1112) or (1122) are more frequently observed in
MSE groups than in non-MSE groups, while such outcomes as (1123) or (1233) that
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involve subjects choosing larger numbers are more frequently observed in the non-MSE
groups than in MSE groups.
Overall, however, the MSEs seem to do a good job of organizing aggregate outcomes
in the LUIGs we have considered. Next, we tested whether the choices made by each
subject followed the predictions under the MSE in each LUIG.
Figure 2 shows, in simplexes, the relative submission frequencies for each integer for
each subject in the four LUIGs. A point in a simplex represents a subject. Here we are
pooling subjects from all the sessions who played the given LUIG. Thus, in each panel,
there are total of 96 dots (subjects), plus the relative frequencies predicted by the MSE
that is shown by a “∗”.
In Figure 2, the relative frequency of a subject submitting 1 is represented by the
height of the point from the edge that is opposite to the apex labeled ‘1’. The relative
frequencies of the subject submitting other integers can be read in the same way in the
figure. For games with M = 4, we added together the relative frequencies of submitting
the two largest integers because they were small compared to the others under their
MSEs.
There are four types of dots in each panel: filled circle, filled triangle, unfilled circle,
and unfilled triangle. These four types of dots represent whether the observed behavior
of a subject represented is significantly different from those predicted by the MSE based
on two criteria: the relative frequencies of chosen numbers (choice) and the frequency
of changing one’s choices from one round to another (change).4 For the choice crite-
rion, subjects are considered to be MSE subjects if their choice frequencies were not
statistically different, at 5% significance level, from those predicted by the MSE accord-
ing to Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) tests. Otherwise, they are considered to be non-MSE
subjects. For the change criterion, subjects are considered to be MSE subjects if their
frequency of changing their choices between two consecutive rounds lies within the 95%
confidence interval predicted by the MSE. Otherwise, they are considered to be non-MSE
subjects.
In Figure 2, the classification under the choice criterion is shown with filled dots
4We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting that we consider the second criterion in addition to
the first one.
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a. LUIG33 b. LUIG34
2 3 & 4
1
2 3 & 4
1
choice\change MSE non-MSE
MSE 42 29
non-MSE 0 25
choice\change MSE non-MSE
MSE 33 27
non-MSE 3 33
c. LUIG43 d. LUIG44
2 3 & 4
1
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1
choice\change MSE non-MSE
MSE 39 32
non-MSE 4 21
choice\change MSE non-MSE
MSE 37 19
non-MSE 4 36
∗: MSE, N: MSE (choice) + MSE (change), •: MSE (choice) + non-MSE (change)
4: non-MSE (choice) + MSE (change), ◦: non-MSE (choice) + non-MSE (change)
Figure 2: Distributions of the relative frequencies of each number chosen. Each point
corresponds to a subject. Subjects classified in two four classifications (1) MSE by both
choice and change criteria (filled triangle), (2) MSE by choice by non-MSE by change
criterion (filled circle), (3) non-MSE by choice by MSE by change criterion (unfilled
triangle), and (4) non-MSE by both choice and change criteria (unfilled circle).
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a. LUIG 33 (95% interval: 25 ∼ 38) b. LUIG 34 (95% interval: 27 ∼ 40)
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c. LUIG 43 (95% interval: 23 ∼ 36) d. LUIG 44 (95% interval: 23 ∼ 36)
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Figure 3: Histogram of the number of changes. The height of each bar represents the
total number of subjects who have demonstrated the given number of changes in their
choices. Blue and red part of bars: MSE and non-MSE subjects according to the choice
criterion. Black line: MSE benchmark. Bars with and without shades: non-MSE and
MSE subjects according to the change criterion.
(MSE) vs non-filled dots (non-MSE), and the classification under the change criterion
is shown with triangle-shaped dots (MSE) vs circle-shaped dots (non-MSE). Thus, for
example, those subjects who are classified as non-MSE subjects for both the choice and
change criteria are depicted with non-filled circles, while those who are classified as MSE
subjects for both criteria are depicted with filled triangles. The table below each panel
shows the number of subjects classified into the four categories in the corresponding
LUIG.
Figure 3 complements Figure 2 by showing the histograms of the number of changes
for each LUIG. The height of each bar is cumulative in that it represents the total num-
ber of subjects who have demonstrated the given number of changes in their choices.
Bars are distinguished into four styles: red vs blue and shaded vs non-shaded. Red and
blue parts of each bar represent non-MSE and MSE subjects according to the choice cri-
11
terion, respectively. Shaded and non-shaded bars represent non-MSE and MSE subjects
according to the change criterion. The possible distribution of the frequency of changes
according to the MSE prediction is shown with the black curve.
As one can note from the table below each panel in Figure 2, while most of the
subjects who are classified as non-MSE under the choice criterion are also classified as
non-MSE under the change criterion, this is not the case for those who are classified
as MSE under the choice criterion. Between 35 and 45 % of subjects classified as MSE
subjects by the choice criterion did not change their choices between two consecutive
rounds as frequently as the MSE predicts. Indeed, there is a positive correlation between
the results of the classification based on these two criteria (φ = 0.47).5
We find that an important fraction (more than 1/3) of our subjects were MSE subjects
under both criteria in each of the four LUIGs. Out of 96 total subjects, the number of
MSE subjects according to both criteria in LUIG33, LUIG34, LUIG43, and LUIG44
were 42, 33, 39, and 37, respectively.6 This finding is similar to Otsubo et al. (2013)
who found that a majority of subjects behaved not significantly differently from what is
predicted under the MSE in their experiment of a LUBA with (N,M) = (5, 4).7
Above analyses demonstrate that although majority of our subjects are classified as
non-MSE subjects according to at least one of the two criteria, the group level outcomes
do not deviate much from the MSE prediction. To understand this gap between indi-
vidual and group level outcomes, we have conducted following exercise. We first fitted a
simple reinforcement learning model to each of our subjects to obtain parameter values
of the model. We then let these fitted learning models to play the same LUIG for 10000
periods. Simulation results show that, similarly to the experimental data, the group level
5Phi coefficients between the results of classification based on the two criteria for four LUIGs are:
0.52, 0.47, 0.34, and 0.56 for LUIG 33, LUIG 34, LUIG 43, and LUIG 44, respectively.
6The number of MSE subjects will decline if we add more criteria in classifying our subjects into MSE
or non-MSE. For example, in addition to the above mentioned two criteria, if we also consider the absence
of statistically significant correlation in their choices between two consecutive periods, the number of
MSE subjects become 39, 30, 37, and 33 in LUIG33, LUIG34, LUIG43, and LUIG44, respectively.
Likewise, the above mentioned two criteria plus generalized runs test (Mielke and Berry, 2007), to test
the randomness of the sequence of choices over 50 periods, show that the number of MSE subjects
becomes 37, 25, 30, and 26 in LUIG33, LUIG34, LUIG43, and LUIG44, respectively.
7Otsubo et al. (2013) reported that the behaviors of the majority of subjects in LUBAs with (N,M) =
(5, 25) and (N,M) = (10, 25) (35 out of 40 and 27 out of 50, respectively) were significantly different from
the MSE of the respective game. They found that many of their subjects in (N,M) = (4, 25) continued
to choose the same number for a much longer duration than expected under the MSE. A lower fraction
of subjects behaving significantly differently from the MSE in the LUBA with (N,M) = (10, 25) than
with (N,M) = (5, 25) suggests that the size of M relative to N plays a role in inducing subjects to
switch their choices across rounds.
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outcomes from the first 50 periods do not deviate significantly from MSE predictions in
most of the simulations. However, if we consider the first 1000 periods or all the 10000
periods, they do deviate significantly in almost all the simulations. This suggests that
the gap between individual and group level deviations from the MSE predictions in our
experimental data may be partly due to the number of repetitions being 50. The detail
of this exercise is available from the authors upon request.
3.1 Performance of MSE vs non-MSE subjects
Let us diverge from testing whether our subjects behaved according to the MSE of the
respective LUIG and move on to ask how often MSE and non-MSE subjects won the
game. Because subjects are classified into four types based on the two criteria we employ,
it is not possible for us to compare within-group differences in the frequencies of winning
among those four types. We thus employ linear regression analysis with robust standard
errors taking within-group clustering effects into account in order to correct for within-
group correlations. The results of these regression analyses are shown in Table 4. The
dependent variable is the number of wins for each subject. Independent variables are
dummy variables that are assigned a value of 1 if a subject is classified as MSE only under
choice criterion (MSE choice only), as MSE only under change criterion (MSE change
only), and as MSE under both choice and change criteria (MSE both). Otherwise, these
dummy variables are assigned a value of 0. We take those subjects who are classified
as non-MSE according to both change and choice criteria as the benchmark. Negative
and significant estimated coefficients on ‘MSE choice only’ show that those who are
classified as MSE only under the choice criterion won significantly less frequently in
each game compared to the benchmark subjects. Similarly, those classified as MSE only
under the change criterion won less often than the benchmark subjects in all the games
except for LUIG 33, but not significantly so. In LUIG 33, they won more often than
the benchmark subjects, but again, not significantly so. Finally, those classified as MSE
under both criteria won more frequently than the benchmark subjects, but again not
significantly so. These results suggest that the classification based on the choice seems
to have more significant explanatory power for the differences in the number of wins in
LUIGs than the classification according to the change criterion. Thus, we focus on choice
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Table 4: Results of linear regression. Dependent variable: Number of wins.
LUIG 33 LUIG 34 LUIG 43 LUIG 44
MSE choice only −8.265 −4.404 −3.814 −2.158
(1.455) (1.403) (0.997) (1.276)
p < 0.001 p = 0.004 p = 0.001 p = 0.104
MSE change only 1.631 −0.848 −2.595 −5.000
(1.232) (1.740) (2.475) (1.963)
p = 0.195 p = 0.629 p = 0.305 p = 0.018
MSE both n.a 0.222 3.006 3.888
(2.009) (2.612) (2.282)
p = 0.913 p = 0.262 p = 0.102
constant 19.920 18.182 11.095 11.000
(0.869) (0.938) (0.971) (0.718)
p < 0.001 p < 0.001 p < 0.001 p < 0.001
No. of Obs 96 96 96 96
R2 0.312 0.139 0.139 0.116
Note: Robust standard errors that correct for group clustering effects are reported in the parentheses.
criterion in the analysis to follow. Focusing on one criterion also allows us to examine
within-group differences in the number of wins between the two types.
Table 5 summarizes, for each LUIG, the average frequencies of “winning” (#wins) as
well as the average frequencies of a subject changing his/her choices between two consec-
utive rounds (#changes) depending on the composition of non-MSE and MSE subjects,
according to the choice criterion alone, within a group. As one would expect from the
results shown above, non-MSE subjects changed their choices much less frequently than
MSE subjects in all four LUIGs. (p < 0.01 for all four LUIGs, Wilcoxon signed rank,
WSR, test). In addition, non-MSE subjects won the game significantly more often than
MSE subjects (p < 0.01 for all four LUIGs, WSR test).8 One can also observe that
when there are more non-MSE subjects in a group, the difference in the average #wins
between non-MSE subjects and MSE subjects is larger in LUIG 33, LUIG 34, and LUIG
44.
The effectiveness of a non-MSE strategy over a MSE strategy has also been reported
in a minority game (Chmura and Pitz, 2006). It seems that in LUIGs as well as in
minority games, it pays to be stubborn and to stick with the same choice, although such
8We employ groups as an independent observation in carrying out these statistical tests. That is,
these p-values are based on the within-group differences of the average #changes and the average #wins
for non-MSE and MSE subjects.
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Table 5: Differences of performance with respect to the constitution of players (p-values
are from Wilcoxon signed rank test.)
a. LUIG 33
non-MSE MSE
#non-MSE #MSE #groups #wins #changes #wins #changes
0 3 15 14.42 26.13
1 2 9 17.00 11.89 12.17 27.50
2 1 8 21.38 5.94 3.50 24.00
3 0 0 – –
p < 0.001 (#wins), p < 0.001 (#changes)
b. LUIG 34
non-MSE MSE
#non-MSE #MSE #groups #wins #changes #wins #changes
0 3 9 14.89 26.96
1 2 12 17.83 14.67 13.79 26.21
2 1 9 19.11 9.94 8.11 26.78
3 0 2 15.67 10.83
p = 0.003 (#wins), p < 0.001 (#changes)
c. LUIG 43
non-MSE MSE
#non-MSE #MSE #groups #wins #changes #wins #changes
0 4 5 9.15 23.10
1 3 14 10.79 14.14 7.29 24.57
2 2 4 12.25 8.25 4.50 22.88
3 1 1 6.00 6.00 2.00 11.00
4 0 0 – –
p = 0.003 (#wins), p < 0.001 (#changes)
d. LUIG 44
non-MSE MSE
#non-MSE #MSE #groups #wins #changes #wins #changes
0 4 3 8.17 31.42
1 3 10 10.50 21.70 9.50 25.10
2 2 5 11.50 13.00 6.20 24.10
3 1 4 10.75 10.50 3.00 23.00
4 0 2 8.88 11.75
p = 0.004 (#wins), p = 0.006 (#changes)
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a strategy only works when there are others who frequently change their choices.
3.2 Behavior in two LUIGs
Let us now go one step further by making use of the fact that each subject played two
LUIGs in our experiment. In the analyses above, within each LUIG we have classified
subjects as either MSE or non-MSE. It is therefore possible that the same subject is
classified as a MSE subject in one game and a non-MSE subject in another. Since we
are interested in subjects separating themselves into different behavioral groups, it is
interesting to check whether the classification of our subjects remains the same across
the two LUIGs they played and, in case it changes for some and remains the same
for others, to investigate what we can learn from the differences in their behavior. In
doing so, we ignore the differences across the four LUIGs because, as noted above, in all
four LUIGs those subjects classified as non-MSE according to their choice frequencies
won significantly more often and changed their choices between two consecutive rounds
significantly less often than those classified as MSE.
We use “t1 → t2” to denote those subjects who were classified as t1 (MSE vs non-
MSE) in Game 1 and t2 (MSE vs non-MSE) in Game 2. The number of subjects who are
‘MSE → MSE’, ‘MSE → non-MSE’, ‘non-MSE → MSE’, and ‘non-MSE → non-MSE’
subjects in our sample are 99, 46, 14, and 33, respectively.
We have conducted the following simple regression analysis. Our dependent variable
is assigned the value 1 if a subject changed his/her choices between rounds r and r + 1,
and is assigned the value 0 otherwise. We then regressed this, using a logit specification,
on a dummy variable that captures whether the subject lost the game in round r or not,
and the interaction terms between the dummy with other dummy variables representing
the classification of the subject, as well as two variables that characterize the LUIG the
subject played, N and M . The dummy variables classify subjects as Type 1, 2, or 3.
These types are defined as follows: Type 1=1 if the subject is ‘non-MSE → MSE’ and
zero otherwise, Type 2=1 if ‘MSE → non-MSE’ and zero otherwise, and Type 3=1 if
‘MSE → MSE’ and zero otherwise. The remaining ‘non-MSE → non-MSE’ are used
as benchmark, and we call them Type 0 below. We compute robust standard errors
taking within-group clustering effects into account in order to correct for within-group
16
correlations. We run this regression separately for Games 1 and 2. We also do a similar
exercise by regressing the same dependent variable on the dummy variable that captures
whether the subject won the game in round r instead of losing in round r, as well as all
the interactions with subject’s type dummies and N and M .
The results of logit regressions are reported in Table 6. The estimated coefficients
reveal interesting differences between our benchmark Type 0 subjects who remained non-
MSE in both games, and those who switch between non-MSE and MSE (Type 1 and
Type 2 as defined above), as well as those who remained MSE in both games (Type 3).
Let’s first consider Type 0 and Type 1, who are both classified as non-MSE in Game
1. While there is no significant difference between these two types in their tendency to
change their choice following a win, Type 1 subjects changed their choices significantly
more often (at 10% level) following a loss than Type 0 subjects in Game 1. Between
Type 0 and Type 2, who are both classified as non-MSE in Game 2 but have different
classifications in Game 1, we find no significant differences in their tendencies to change
their choices following either a win or a loss in Game 1. However, we do find a significant
difference in their tendency to change their choices following a loss in Game 2 but no
such tendency following a win in Game 2. Namely, Type 2 subjects changed their choice
significantly more frequently following a loss than Type 0 subjects. Finally, between Type
0 and Type 3, the latter subjects changed their choices significantly more frequently both
following a loss and a win in both Game 1 and Game 2 than the former.
Thus, what really separates the subjects seems to be their tendencies to change their
choices following a loss. Subjects who are consistently classified as non-MSE in both
games change their choices significantly less often following losses compared to those
who are classified as non-MSE in one game and MSE in another. Note again that this
difference in the tendencies to change their choices following a loss is observed in games
where two types of subjects are both classified as non-MSE. Those who are consistently
classified as MSE in both games change their strategy more often than those non-MSE
subjects regardless of the outcome (a win or a loss) of the game.
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Table 6: Result of logit regression. Dependent variable =1 if a subject changed their
choice between rounds r and r + 1.
D=1 if lost in round r D=1 if won in round r
Game 1 Game 2 Game 1 Game 2
D −0.308 −0.993 −0.882 −0.699
(0.361) (0.424) (0.438) (0.426)
p = 0.092 p = 0.019 p = 0.044 p = 0.101
D × type1 1.076 0.687 1.088 0.231
(0.613) (0.684) (0.708) (0.758)
p = 0.079 p = 0.315 p = 0.124 p = 0.760
D × type2 0.405 1.212 0.557 0.937
(0.483) (0.580) (0.547) (0.607)
p = 0.401 p = 0.037 p = 0.309 p = 0.123
D × type3 1.037 1.196 1.120 0.911
(0.475) (0.441) (0.539) (0.494)
p = 0.029 p = 0.007 p = 0.038 p = 0.065
N 0.121 0.275 0.054 0.281
(0.339) 0.284 (0.327) (0.279)
p = 0.720 p = 0.332 p = 0.868 p = 0.314
M 0.526 0.140 0.482 0.134
(0.337) 0.277 (0.331) (0.276)
p = 0.119 p = 0.612 p = 0.145 p = 0.627
constant −2.240 −1.685 −1.746 −1.683
(1.640) (1.431) (1.536) (1.454)
p = 0.172 p = 0.239 p = 0.256 p = 0.247
No. of Obs 9408 9408 9408 9408
R2 0.032 0.028 0.019 0.011
log likelihood −6302.14 −6278.71 −6387.71 −6391.28
Note: Robust standard errors that correct for group clustering effects are reported in the parentheses.
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4 Concluding Remark
In this paper, we used laboratory experiments to study how subjects play Lowest Unique
Integer Games (LUIGs) and to attempt to determine if and how subjects self-organize
into groups behaving differently. We considered four LUIGs with the number of players
(N) being 3 or 4, and the maximum integer each player can choose (M) being 3 or 4. We
found that the choices made by more than 1/3 of our subjects over 50 rounds of a LUIG
were not significantly different from those predicted under the MSE of the LUIG. We
also found that the subjects who won more often were those who behaved significantly
differently from the MSE prediction by keep choosing the same number. However, such
a strategy of choosing the same number only works in a LUIG if others do not employ
the same strategy; otherwise, concurrent strategies of not changing choices could lead to
an extreme congestion effect with no winners, i.e. multiple subjects repeatedly choosing
the lowest number available. And we found that the distinguishing feature among our
subjects when playing LUIGs was their tendencies to change their choices following a
loss. Those who changed their choices significantly less often following a loss were the
ones who won the game more often. These results provide experimental insight into both
the manner in which LUIGs are played and how subjects self-select in situations where
there is the congestion effect.
Future research may include exploring the effect of changing the amount of feedback
subjects receive after each round of a game. For example, in addition to informing sub-
jects about the winning number as we did in our experiment, one can consider informing
subjects about all of the submitted numbers to investigate how providing more detailed
feedback influences subjects’ behavior. Other fruitful avenues for future research in-
clude eliciting a mixed strategy directly from subjects as done by Chmura and Gu¨th
(2011) for a three-player minority game, or eliciting a behavioral rule (repeated game
strategy) as done by Linde et al. (2014) to better understand the behavior of subjects
in LUIGs. The latter is particularly interesting because our subjects played the same
LUIG repeatedly with the same group of subjects. Expanding the analyses to include
repeated game strategies in such environments have been shown to provide rich insights
in various two-player games, such as Prisoners’ Dilemma, Coordination, Chicken, and
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Battle-of-the-Sexes, by Hanaki et al. (2005) and Ioannou and Romero (2014). We expect
it will do the same in LUIGs. It is also of interest to gather more data on individual
characteristics such as time and risk preferences as well as competitiveness to investigate
whether and how they are related to the observed behavior in LUIGs.
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A Instructions
We distributed a handout to our subjects and the experimenter read the script aloud.
The handout with the script is attached to this manuscript as a separate file.
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(A#er&the&quiz)&Thank&you.&
&

Now&we&will&explain&the&outline&of&today’s&game.&
&
Go&on&to&the&next&page.

&&&&The&game&you&are&going&to&play&is&as&follows:&
&
&&You&will&be&a&member&of&a&group&consisEng&of&N&players.&
F &Before&the&start&of&a&game,&the&computer&will&randomly&determine&the&members&of&
your&group.&
F &Your&group&will&not&change&within&the&game&(There&are&50&rounds&in&a&game).&
F &The&number&of&players&(including&you)&will&be&indicated&on&the&screen.&
F &But&you&will&not&be&informed&of&the&idenEty&of&the&other&players&in&your&group.

&&In&each&round&of&a&game,&each&of&you&are&asked&to&choose&an&integer&between&1&and&M.&
M&will&be&clearly&indicated&on&your&computer&screen.&
(A&liNle&bit&slowly)&
&&The&winner&in&the&group&for&the&round&is&the&one&who&has&chosen&the$smallest$number$
that$is$not$chosen$by$anyone$else$in$the$group.&
&
&&If&there&is&NOT&such&a&member&of&the&group,&there&is&no&winner.&
&
&&We&will&explain&the&rules&of&the&game&with&a&few&examples.&
&
&&Go&on&to&the&next&page.

&&Now,&let&us&consider&the&following&game.&This&game&has&four&players,&A,&B,&C&and&D,&and&
each&of&them&chooses&an&integer&between&1&and&4.

Let’s&imagine&that&players&have&chosen&the&following&numbers:&
&
If&Player&A&chooses&1,&B&chooses&2,&C&chooses&3&and&D&chooses&4,&then&Player&A&
wins&this&game&because&1&is&the&smallest&integer&that&is&NOT&chosen&by&
anyone&else.&
&
Go&on&to&the&next&page.

Second,&let’s&imagine,&players&have&chosen&the&following&numbers:&&
Players&A&and&B&choose&1,&C&chooses&3&and&D&chooses&4.&In&this&case,&Player&C&wins&
this&game&because&1&is&chosen&by&two&players&and&3&is&the&smallest&
integer&that&is&NOT&chosen&by&anyone&else.
	
Thirdly,&let’s&imagine,&players&have&chosen&the&following&numbers:&
All&of&them&choose&1.&In&this&case,&there&is&no&winner&because&there&is&no&integer&that&is&
NOT&chosen&by&anyone&else.&
&
Go&on&to&the&next&page.



Fourthly,&let’s&imagine,&players&have&chosen&the&following&numbers:&
Players&A&and&B&choose&1&and&Players&C&and&D&choose&2.&In&this&case,&there&is&also&
no&winner&because&both&integers&are&chosen&by&two&players.

&&In&today's&experiment,&all&of&you&will&play&two&kinds&of&this&game.&
&
&&You&will&be&divided&into&several&groups.&
F &Each&group&has&three&or&four&players.&&
F &The&number&of&players&in&your&group&and&&
the&range&of&numbers&you&can&choose&from&will&be&clearly&indicated&on&your&screen&at&
the&beginning&of&each&game.&
&
&&During&the&50&rounds&of&a&game&experiment,&the&members&of&your&group&will&not&
change.&
&
Go&on&to&the&next&page.

&&In&addiEon&to&the&parEcipaEon&fee&of&10&euros,&the&winner&of&one&randomly&chosen&round&of&each&game&
will&be&rewarded&with&20&euros.&&
F One&out&of&50&rounds&from&Game&1&and&another&out&of&50&rounds&from&Game&2&will&be&chosen&randomly&&
at&the&end&of&the&experiment&to&be&used&for&payment.&
F Thus,&you&can&earn&the&maximum&of&40&euros&+&the&parEcipaEon&fee.&
F &At&the&end&of&each&round,&you&will&be&informed&whether&you&won&in&the&round.&
F &At&the&end&of&the&experiment,&you&will&be&informed&which&round&was&chosen&in&each&game.

&&You&can&see&the&screenshot&of&the&interface.&This&interface&has&ﬁve&parts:&
F Game&informaEon&
Tells&you&what&kind&of&game&you&are&playing.&
&
F Current&round&
Informs&you&of&the&current&round&of&the&experiment.&
&
F Remaining&Eme&
This&shows&the&remaining&Eme&to&entering&your&choice.&&
The&Eme&limit&to&enter&your&choice&is&15&seconds.&
When&the&Eme&has&elapsed,&a&red&warning&message&will&ﬂash&at&the&top&right&corner&of&
your&screen.&
&
F Input&
&
There&will&be&three&or&four&buNons.&By&clicking&one&of&them,&your&choice&is&temporarily&
determined.&
&
F OK&
Submits&your&decision&to&our&server&when&pressed.&If&you&forget&to&choose&one&integer,&a&
cauEon&screen&appears.&
&
Go&on&to&the&next&page.&

When&you&ﬁnish&submibng&your&choice,&you&will&see&this&announcement.&In&this&case,&
please&wait&for&a&while.

This&screen&displays&the&game&result.&You&can&see&your&chosen&integer&
and&the&winning&integer&(`0'&if&there&is&no&winner).&
&
When&you&win,&the&statement&``You&won.''&will&be&displayed.&
&
Press&[OK]&a#er&conﬁrming&and&wait&for&the&next&round.&
&
Go&on&to&the&next&page.

When&you&lose&the&game,&the&statement&``You&lost.''&will&be&displayed&.&
&
Press&[OK]&a#er&conﬁrming&the&result&and&wait&for&the&next&round.

Before&starEng&the&experiments,&we&would&like&to&run&an&exercise.&By&doing&so,&you&will&
be&able&to&understand&what&today's&game&is&all&about.&Please&note&that&this&exercise&does&
not&aﬀect&your&scores&or&rewards.&
&
Go&on&to&the&next&page.

In&the&exercise,&you&will&be&asked&several&quesEons&about&today's&game.&&
A#er&reading&the&statements,&click&one&of&the&buNons&and&then&press&[OK].&
&
	
If&your&answer&is&correct,&you&will&see&the&screen&saying&"Correct!"&as&the&ﬁgure&shows.&&
You&must&wait&unEl&all&of&the&others&ﬁnish&answering.&
&
Go&on&to&the&next&page.


On&the&other&hand,&if&your&answer&is&incorrect,&the&following&screen&appears.&&
In&this&case,&please&press&[OK]&and&try&again.&
&
So,&press&[ConEnue]&to&start&the&exercise!

(A#er&conﬁrming&the&end&of&the&test&session.)&
&
Now&we&start&Game&1.&Please&doubleFclick&on&the&indicated&icon&on&the&
computer&screen.&
&
You&will&see&the&number&of&players&in&your&group&and&the&numbers&you&can&choose&from.&
&
When&the&``End&of&Game&1''&screen&appears,&please&wait&without&pressing&
any&buNon.&
&
Press&[OK]&to&start!&
&
(A#er&Game&1)&Go&on&to&the&next&page.

Thank&you.&Please&do&not&touch&computers&unEl&you&are&instructed&to&do&
so.&If&you&need&to&use&a&restroom,&please&raise&your&hand.&
&
(A#er&conﬁrming)&
Please&press&[ConEnue].&

Now&we&start&Game&2.&Press&[OK]&to&conEnue.&You&will&see&the&number&of&
players&in&your&group&and&the&numbers&you&can&choose&from.&
&
When&the&screen&saying&``End&of&Game&2’’&appears,&please&wait&without&pressing&any&
buNon.&
&
Press&[OK]&to&start!&
&
(A#er&Game&2)&Go&on&to&the&next&page.

Thank&you.&
&
We&now&proceed&to&the&quesEonnaire.&Please&wait&for&the&next&instrucEons.&
&
Press&[ConEnue]&to&proceed.

You&will&see&how&you&did&in&a&randomly&chosen&round&from&each&game.&

